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I~ ,_fHE SUPREME COURT 
OF rfHE 
STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff-Respondent, 
-vs-
JEAN SINCLAIR, 
Defendant-Appellant. 
Respondent's Brief in Answer to 
Appellant's Petition for Rehearing 
PRELI~1IINARY STATEMENT 
No. 9971 
The respondent, State of Utah, submits the following 
brief in answer to the appellant's petition for rehearing. It 
is submitted that the appellant is still unable to grasp the 
rule of appellate review that the evidence will be viewed in 
a light most favorable to the jury's verdict. Secondly, ap-
pellant refers to the case as a capital case. Indeed, many 
good arguments can be made for imposition of the maxi-
mum penalty in this case; however, the case as it now stands 
before the court is non-capital. There is no rule requiring 
an appellant court to make any different review of a case on 
appeal when the crime is murder. Each criminal case is 
entitled to a review for misapplication of law and a review 
of the evidence in a light most favorable to the jury's ver-
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2 
diet. It is submitted that the opinion and judgment of the 
court is proper when so viewed and that there is no merit to 
the appellant's petition for rehearing. 
POINT I 
THE COURT'S OPINION IS A FAIR AND PROPER AP-
PRAISAL OF THE EVIDENCE WHEN VIEWED IN A LIGHT 
MOST FAVORABLE TO THE JURY'S VERDICT. 
(a) The record clearly supports the statement in the 
court's opinion that the police received a tip from LaRae 
Peterson to look to Jean Sinclair as respects the killing of 
Don Foster. Officer Glen Cahoon testified that he had a 
phone conversation ·with LaRae Peterson on the 5th of 
January, 1963, at about 2:00p.m., in the afternoon after 
Foster was killed, directing him to Jean Sinclair (R. 1338-
1339). This, consequently, was a factor corroborative of 
Sinclair's participation in the crime, since LaRae Peterson 
was aware of the feelings Sinclair had concerning Foster 
and had been present at the time Foster was killed. 
(b) The court's opinion states that Jean Sinclair was 
dressed "in gray men's pants, had on boots, and had a tan 
trench coat wrapped around the gun." The appellant con-
tends that the record does not support this statement. The 
record, at page 580, clearly shows: 
"A. And light gray flannel pants. I believe a white shirt and 
a belt, although I don't remember which belt, and a blue parka, 
reversible parka, whatever you call them." 
Further, it is admitted that Kuehne mentioned that the 
coat was "white" (R. 579, 584); however, in response to 
the district attorney's question, Kuehne indicated it was a 
"light coat" (R. 581). In addition, in response to a ques-
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tion from the district attorney to describe the coat, Kuehne 
stated ( R. 585) : 
"Q. !"{o"', will you drsnibe the trench coat for us? 
A. It was quite similar to this one that's hanging over here. 
Q. You mean this one right here? 
.\. Yes, except a slightly different grade of material, I believe. 
Q. Different grade of material, but approximately the same 
color? 
A. That's right. 
Q. Either a white or a light beige then, is that correct? 
A. That's right." 
A coat, therefore, was picked out that was light, either 
white or tan. The cleaners where Miss Sinclair took a coat 
stated there was virtually no difference between beige and 
tan. This should be compared with the testimony of LaMar 
Williams ( R. 981 ) , who testified the person he saw ( resem-
bling Jean Sinclair) was wearing a "light" coat. Boyd K. 
Harvey described the coat of the person he saw running 
away as a "light colored" coat ( R. 986) . Clearly, there-
fore, the evidence is even more unfavorable to appellant 
than she would like the court to believe. Various shades 
may be described in different ways, depending on the per-
son. The weight of the testimony is still a matter for the 
jUry. 
(c) The court's statement that Jean Sinclair was seen 
driving around with Kuehne to find a vantage point to kill 
Foster is somewhat inaccurate, but merely combines two 
facts. First, Kuehne and Sinclair did ride around in an 
automobile while Sinclair looked for a spot to kill Foster 
(R. 540, 541) . They were not observed together at this 
time, although, as counsel for appellant points out, they 
were together with Vaughn Humphries in an automobile 
a few months before the killing. However, Miss Sinclair's 
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car was seen by La Von Turner, Don Foster's mother, cir-
cling around her house when LaRae Peterson and Foster 
were at her house for dinner (R. 1603). Further, LaRae 
Peterson testified that she and Foster were followed on 
occasion ( R. 778) and Jean Sinclair had asked Vaughn 
Humphries to follow Foster and Peterson (R. 735). At best, 
the difference is a slight one and in no way is such as to 
warrant any of appellant's claim. 
(d) The appellant contends the court's statement (page 
3 of appellant's brief), relating to the testimony of LaMar 
Williams, is inaccurate. Appellant's position is not true. 
The record clearly and authoratively supports the court's 
statement. The appellant refuses to give a fair treatment to 
the testimony of Mr. Williams. It is clear that Jean Sin-
clair was dressed very similar to the way the person running 
away from the scene of the crime was dressed. She was de-
scribed as wearing darker clothing or trousers and a light 
coat ( R. 980-981 ) . It is clear from Williams' testimony 
that he described the trousers as being darker than the light 
coat, which is identical to the way Kuehne and Boyd Har-
vey described the clothing of Jean Sinclair. 
In response to the contention that the individual that 
Mr. Williams saw weighed 165 to 180 pounds, he estimated 
this to be "with the clothing they were wearing" ( R. 983). 
It should be remembered that Jean Sinclair was wearing a 
heavy parka, shirt and trousers, and, with a trench coat 
over the parka, a manlike resemblance would very easily 
have looked the weight that was estimated. 
Contrary to the appellant's assertion in the petition for 
rehearing, Mr. Williams clearly identified Miss Sinclair: 
"Q. Now, I'll ask you if after this particular time you have seen 
anyone who resembles the person's features that you saw that 
night? 
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A Yes, I have seen someone who resembles the features. 
Q. And who is that person? 
A. That is the defendant, Jean Sinclair." (R. 980) 
Further, the witness did not withdraw his identification of 
Miss Sinclair as to the structure of her face. Thus, in re-
sponse to a question by counsel, asking where the particular 
"S-curve" was in Miss Sinclair's face, the following oc-
curred: 
"Q. (By Mr. Hatch) Where is the S-curve, as you put it? 
A. Directly underneath the lower lip, sir. (R. 982) 
Additionally, appellant's assertion that Mr. Williams 
only saw Miss Sinclair through the rear-view mirror is en-
tirely incorrect since the record discloses that he stated: 
"A. I saw this person coming from the archway to my east from 
where my car was parked." (R. 979) 
.\clmittedly, he indicated that he saw her through the rear-
view mirror, but a fair reading of the testimony is that he 
saw her walk from the archway past his car, and saw her 
after she had passed the car by looking through the rear-
view mirror. The record is clear that he had a full view 
of ~I iss Sinclair. 
Finally, the area where Mr. Williams saw Miss Sinclair 
is definitely nowhere near a full block from the place the 
shooting occurred. The distance is merely one tier of apart-
ments over from the apartment area where Don Foster 
lived and would at best be a few hundred feet. 
~Ir. \Villiams' testimony fully demonstrates the corrobo-
rative effect of the evidence. 
(e) The court's statement as to what Mr. Boyd K. Har-
\·ey testified to is absolutely correct. Mr. Harvey described 
the person as wearing a "three quarter length light colored 
car coat" \ R. 986). He indicated that the coat broke in 
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the area of the knees. The appellant has carefully left from 
page 4 of her brief the color of the coat, since it obviously 
is similar to what Mr. Williams and Karl Kuehne described 
the coat to be. 
Appellant's assertion that the statement as to the car 
is inaccurate is erroneous since the court indicates that Mr. 
Harvey described the car which he saw the person get into 
as being a two-tone car. Further the record clearly supports 
the fact that the defendant owned a two-tone car, also of a 
General Motors make. 
(f) The appellant's position on the testimony of Mr. 
and Mrs. Pieter Combee at page 5 of her brief is ridiculous. 
Mr. and Mrs. Combee's testimony is clearly to the effect 
that LaRae Peterson cried out, "Oh, God, she killed him" 
(R. 1229, 1240). Although LaRae Peterson testified that 
she said, "Oh my God, he's been shot," the jury was free to 
believe whomever they desired and since LaRae Peterson 
was anything but a friendly witness to the State's position, 
the jury was certainly justified in believing independent and 
unbiased witnesses. 
Once again, this is simply the inability of the appellant 
to accept the proper basis for review on appeal, that the 
evidence will be viewed in a light most favorable to the 
jury's verdict. 
Further, although the opinion of the court mentions that 
the Combee's home was directly immediately west of the 
Susan Kay Arms, the home is immediately south and west 
of the parking area where Don Foster was killed and is 
adjacent to it . 
. (g) The appellant, in commenting on the testimony of 
the cleaners, is completely distorting the record. As noted 
above, all of the witnesses were in general agreement as to 
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the color of the coat that Miss Sinclair took to the cleaners. 
Kuehne said it could be either white or beige. The two wit-
nesses who obseiVed Miss Sinclair at the scene of the shoot-
ing described the coat as a light coat. All the witnesses 
picked out the same coat which was in the courtroom. Mr. 
\\'illiams described the trousers as "darker trousers" (R. 
980-981) but only in reference to being darker than the 
coat. This is exactly in accord with Kuehne's testimony and 
the other witnesses, indicating that Miss Sinclair was wear-
ing darker colored trousers. 
Joyce Harris, who testified as to Miss Sinclair's bringing 
the clothing in to be laundered, described the coat as being 
''a tan trench coat" (R. 992), and identified the same coat 
as Kuehne had identified in the courtroom as being similar 
in color ( R. 993) . Further, she described the coat as a 
"three quarter length coat" (R. 993). She did not mention 
at any time that the coat was a whipcord coat but described 
it as a trench coat. Further, Miss Harris indicated that 
there was little difference between a beige and tan coat ( R. 
997). 
Additionally, it should be noted that Mr. Allred testified 
that it was an overcoat and tan, and picked out the same 
coat that the other witnesses had identified as being similar 
( R. 1001, 1002) . He testified further that there were grease 
and dirt stains on the clothing. 
Finally, Officer Alex Paul described the coat as a three 
quarter length tan trench coat which was quite dirty (R. 
1007). 
• Obviously, therefore, the court's statement is fully and 
fairly corroborated by the record. 
(h) Finally, the appellant indicates that Mrs. Combee's 
identification of Jean Sinclair was only from a right rear 
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view and that she never saw the face. This again is errone-
ous and is a misstatement of the record. Thus, Mrs. Combee 
testified: 
"Q. All you saw was the jacket, is that correct? 
A. Yes, that is correct, and her face/' (R. 916) 
Additionally, she made it very clear that she had seen 
Miss Sinclair ( R. 918, Lines 14 through 18) . 
An analysis of the appellant's objections to the court's 
opinion discloses that appellant has done the very thing 
which she contends the court did, that is, she has failed to 
view the evidence in total and has fly-specked portions of 
the opinion and taken matters out of context in an effort to 
support her position. The court's opinion clearly was based 
upon factors directly in the record and is thoroughly sup-
ported by items of testimony in evidence which the jury 
considered and could have well felt crucial. 
POINT II 
THERE IS AMPLE EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE KARL 
KUEHNE'S TESTIMONY. 
In Point II of appellant's brief, appellant re-argues the 
same issue which was argued in the main portion of her 
brief, that there is insufficient evidence to corroborate the 
testimony of Karl Kuehne. The court is directed to the 
brief of respondent, State of Utah, heretofore filed with the 
court, pages 15 through 23, which, it is submitted, clearly 
refutes the contention of the appellant. 
( 1 ) Mrs. Kuehne's testimony as to Miss Sinclair's state-
ment that Karl Kuehne could get some money fast is a fac-
tor which, when considered with the presence of motive, 
malice, and other matters of record, lends weight to the 
conclusion that Jean Sinclair killed Don Foster. 
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( ~) The fact that Miss Sinclair's car was seen following 
LaRae Peterson and Don Foster, and the fact that she had 
asked Vaughn Humphries to follow them is an additional 
corroborative fact which, when taken with other evidence, 
amply supports the court's determination. The testimony 
of LaMar B. Williams was to the effect that he saw a person 
resembling Jean Sinclair in the vicinity of the scene of the 
crime shortly before it occurred. The clothing which she 
was wearing, as he saw it, was similar to the clothing which 
Boyd Harvey described as being worn by the person who 
ran away immediately after the shooting. Further, Mr. 
Harvey's identification of a two-tone automobile and the 
fact that Miss Sinclair owned such an automobile is an ad-
ditional matter of corroborative evidence. 
( 3) The testimony of the employees of the cleaning es-
tablishment, that Miss Sinclair brought clothing into the 
establishment the next day for cleaning, which clothing was 
similar to the clothing LaMar Williams and Boyd Harvey 
identified the person to be wearing at the scene of the crime, 
is also corroborative. Further, the spots on the clothing are 
corroborative of being near automobiles on a hard-topped 
surface which is the nature of the surface at the Susan Kay 
Arms where the automobiles were parked. 
( 4) Mrs. Combee's identification of the defendant is 
clearly borne out by the record. The appellant's assertion 
that State v. Sommers, 97 U. 132, 90 P.2d 273 ( 1939), is 
somehow contrary to the court's opinion is erroneous, since 
in that opinion the court expressly noted that the presence 
of an individual in the vicinity of a crime may be persuasive 
of the individual's connection with the crime. The court 
stated: 
"* * * This may, under some circumstances, be persuasive of 
accused's connection with the burning of the building,* * *." 
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Although the court in that case found that the presence of 
the accused was not corroborative, it was only because the 
accused lived in the area and had an otherwise exculpatory 
reason for his presence. There was no reason for Miss Sin-
clair's presence. She did not live in the area and, in fact, at 
one point stated that she had never been there. Conse-
quently, this factor is directly corroborative. 
Finally, the appellant's assertion that somehow there is 
no evidence sufficient to show an intense relationship be-
tween LaRae Peterson and Jean Sinclair is simply absurd, 
since the record overwhelmingly shows the nature of the 
relationship and the intensity of the feeling between LaRae 
Peterson and Jean Sinclair, and the appellant simply re-
fuses to recognize the evidence and, in begging the court to 
ignore it, asks the court to commit error. Further, the rela-
tionship between LaRae Peterson and Jean Sinclair is 
another factor relevant to the fact that Miss Sinclair com-
mitted the crime. Reliance upon The Matter of the Con-
tempt of LaRae Peterson, 386 P.2d 727 ( 1963), to contend 
that the testimony is not important, is misplaced. In that 
case the court expressly noted that the relationship "might 
have a tendency to prove motive for such an act" and as is 
noted in 23 C.J.S., Criminal Law, Sec. 812 ( 4) and State 
v. Bolton, 65 Mont. 74, 212 P. 504 ( 1922), motive when 
coupled with other evidence may be corroborative of the 
commission of the crime by the person charged. 
POINT III 
THE OTHER POINTS IN APPELLANT'S PETITION FOR 
REHEARING ARE WITHOUT MERIT. 
Appellant contends that the law of corroboration would 
be changed by the court's opinion. This is not so. The court 
correctly states the test to be applied, weighs the evidence 
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and when the evidence and the test are examined against 
other valid precedents (see respondent's brief, pages 15 
through 23), the opinion of the court is clearly correct. 
The appellant's assertion that the Contempt of LaRae 
Peterson, 386 P.2d 727 ( 1963), involves the same situation 
as this case simply is not correct. An entirely different prin-
ciple was involved and the court clearly recognized the rele-
vancy of such evidence to the Sinclair case and merely de-
termined that Mrs. Peterson had a privilege which over-
rode the usual rules of relevancy and materiality. As noted 
previously in respondent's brief, the privilege is exclusively 
that of a witness and the defendant may not claim benefit 
by it. 
Finally, it should be noted that numerous points in the 
appellant's brief were frivolous, legally unmeritorious and 
would add nothing to the state of the law. Consequently, 
the court was correct in not unduly burdening the opinion 
with the points. 
Further, the fact that the opinion may treat points raised 
by the appellant with less literary force than she would have 
does not mean that the court did not thoroughly consider 
each of the points. 
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CONCLUSION 
It is respectfully submitted that the appellant's petition 
for rehearing is patently without merit. It attacks the 
court's opinion without justification in numerous instances, 
misquotes the record and cites authorities out of context,l 
There is, therefore, absolutely no basis which would war-
rant this court in granting a petition for rehearing. 
Respectfully submitted, 
A. PRATT KESLER 
Attorney General 
RONALD N. BOYCE 
Chief Assistant Attorney General 
Attorneys for Respondent 
1 An example of this is the appellant's citation of State v. Crank, 142 P.2d 178, 
for the position that the conduct of the jury foreman and Mrs. Com~ee was 
prejudicial error. It suffices to note that the Crank case did not cons1de~ !he 
issue of juror misconduct for error and, as the court points out in the opm10n 
heretofore issued, was speaking of what ought to be and not what warrants re· 
versal. Finally, appellant refuses to recognize the case of State v. McNaughtan, 
92 U. 114, 66 P.2d 137 (1937), where, in an identical case, this court ruled 
that there was no prejudicial error. 
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